Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I

appreciate this opportunity for us to examine, with these experts,

the national security challenge that we face with regard to Iran,

and also to explore the options. So, thank you for making this opportunity

possible. It’s a critically important issue.

I wanted to try to get to about three areas, if possible. The first

one, I wanted to direct Mr. Fitzpatrick’s attention to just a very

brief background that I’ll provide, and then also your testimony on

some of the technical aspects of this. For those of us who are not

scientists I want to try to achieve some clarity.

One of the problems with the question of where Iran is with its

nuclear capability, both where they are and what the timeframe

is—it’s almost like we get a continual stream of pronouncements

about where they are and what the timeframe is—after a while,

there’s kind of a blizzard of facts and seemingly inconsistent assertions

about it. Even this weekend, we saw Secretary Gates saying

something, and Admiral Mullen saying something, which seemed to

be, if you read it carefully—you can read them together and may

not have an inconsistency, but the way they’re sometimes articulated can be confusing.

I’m looking at two descriptions here. One is yours. I’ll start with

a general summary, here, of something that isn’t in your testimony,

but I think is consistent, the annual threat assessment presented—

or submitted, I should say—to the Senate Committee on Intelligence,

saying that the key components that Iran had to successfully

complete in order to obtain a nuclear weapon are the following.

One, production of fissile material; we know that. Two,

effective means for delivery, for weapon delivery. And three,

design, weaponization, and testing of the warhead.

And I noticed in your testimony—first of all, it’s helpful when

you make statements in your testimony like ‘‘having a stockpile of

enriched uranium is not the same thing as having a bomb.’’ In the

public press, sometimes they get confused. But, I was interested,

on the top of page three of your testimony, where you say, ‘‘For a

weapon, the low-enriched uranium first would have to be further

enriched to 90 percent or more.’’ And then you go on from there.

Could you answer the question in two ways? No. 1, what are the

specific steps the Iranian regime would have to take to reach the

point where they could actually launch a nuclear weapon? In other

words, the ultimate threat. And No. 2, what is the timeframe that

you think—within which that could happen? Because we hear all

kinds of timeframes—2010 to 2015, some say 2013. Just like the

question itself, the timeframe has become kind of a blizzard of assertions.

So, that would be step one. Six months for that step.

Thank you for that. And I wanted to pursue this

subject a little further, but I’ll move on, because I know we have limited time.

I wanted to move to the question of the relationship between this

threat—and I’m directing my question to Ambassador Wisner and

also Mr. Haass—the question of this threat, that we’re here to discuss,

and the posture that Iran has to Israel, which is obviously

extremely adverse and hostile. And I guess the first question I

have is with regard to what’s happening right now. Is it your belief

that Iran is actively undermining the peace process in the Middle

East right now? And if that is your belief, what’s the evidence of that?

I think my time’s—— That’s OK. My time is up, but I wanted to,

maybe, take 1 minute, if it’s possible, Mr. Haass, just to respond, as well.

Thank you. Thank you.